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Abstract
Reinforcement learning algorithms usually as-
sume that all actions are always available to an
agent. However, both people and animals un-
derstand the general link between the features of
their environment and the actions that are feasible.
Gibson (1977) coined the term “affordances” to
describe the fact that certain states enable an agent
to do certain actions, in the context of embodied
agents. In this paper, we develop a theory of affor-
dances for agents who learn and plan in Markov
Decision Processes. Affordances play a dual role
in this case. On one hand, they allow faster plan-
ning, by reducing the number of actions available
in any given situation. On the other hand, they
facilitate more efficient and precise learning of
transition models from data, especially when such
models require function approximation. We es-
tablish these properties through theoretical results
as well as illustrative examples. We also propose
an approach to learn affordances and use it to
estimate transition models that are simpler and
generalize better.
1. Introduction
Humans and animals have an exceptional ability to per-
ceive their surroundings and understand which behaviors
can be carried out successfully. For example, a hard sur-
face enables walking or running, whereas a slippery surface
enables skating or sliding. This capacity to focus on the
most relevant behaviors in a given situation enables efficient
decision making by limiting the choices of action that are
even considered, and leads to quick adaptation to changes
in the environment.
Gibson (1977) defined affordances as different possibilities
of action that the environment affords to an agent. For exam-
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ple, water affords the action of swimming to a fish, but not
to a land animal. Hence, affordances are a function of the
environment as well as the agent, and emerge out of their in-
teraction. Heft (1989) discussed the fact that affordances are
located at the agent-environment boundary. Gibson (1977)
pointed out that affordances can also be viewed as a way to
characterize an agent’s state in an action-oriented fashion.
For example, a seat can be any object on which one can sit
above from the ground, regardless of its shape or color. This
view leads potentially to very robust generalization when
processing the perceptual stream in order to determine what
to do. We take inspiration from Gibson (1977), Heft (1989),
and Chemero (2003) and provide a framework that enables
artificially intelligent (AI) agents to represent and reason
about their environment through the lens of affordances.
In this paper, we focus on reinforcement learning (RL)
agents (Sutton & Barto, 2018). We aim to endow RL agents
with the ability to represent and learn affordances, which
can help them to plan more efficiently, and lead to better
generalization. While defining affordances is not a new
topic in AI (see Sec. 8 for a discussion of related work),
our approach builds directly on the general framework of
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), in its traditional form.
In order to define affordances, we need to first capture the
notion of what it would mean for an agent to carry out an
action “successfully”. To do this, we introduce the notion
of intent, i.e., a desired outcome for an action. Affordances
will then capture a subset of the state-action space in which
the intent is achieved. This view is very compatible with
model-based RL, in which the transition model captures the
consequences of actions. However, learning an accurate
model of the entire environment can be quite difficult, es-
pecially in large environments. Hence, we propose to learn
affordances, and use them to define partial models (Talvitie
& Singh, 2009), which focus on making high quality predic-
tions for a subset of state and actions: those linked through
an affordance..
We first define affordances in MDPs (Sec. 3) and quantify
the value loss when replacing the true MDP model with an
affordance-based model (Sec. 4). Then, we investigate the
setting in which affordance-based partial models are learned
from data, and we show that the planning loss is bounded,
with high probability (Sec. 5). The bound is given in terms
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of the complexity of the policy class determined by the size
of the affordances. We provide empirical illustrations for
this analysis (Sec. 6). Finally, we propose an approach to
learn affordances from data and use it to estimate a partial
model of the world (Sec. 7). Our results provide evidence
that affordances and partial models lead to improved gener-
alization and stability in the learning process.
2. Background
In reinforcement learning (RL), a decision-making agent
must learn to interact with an environment, through a se-
quence of actions, in order to maximize its expected long-
term return (Sutton & Barto, 2018). This interaction is typi-
cally formalized using the framework of Markov Decision
Processes (MDPs). An MDP is a tuple M = 〈S,A, r, P, γ〉,
where S is a set of states,A is a set of actions, r : S ×A →
[0, Rmax] is the reward function, P : S × A → Dist(S)
is the environment’s transition dynamics, mapping state-
action pairs to a distribution over next states, Dist(S),
and γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. At each time step
t, the agent observes a state st ∈ S and takes an ac-
tion at ∈ A drawn from a policy pi : S → Dist(A).
Then, with probability P (st+1|st, at), the agent enters
the next state st+1 ∈ S, receiving a numerical reward
r(st, at). The value function for a policy pi is defined as:
Vpi(s) = E
[∑∞
t=0 γ
tr(st, at)
∣∣s0 = s, at ∼ pi(·|st),∀t] .
For simplicity of exposition, we assume henceforth that
the MDP’s state and action space are finite, though the ideas
we present can be extended naturally to the infinite setting.
The goal of an agent is to find the optimal policy, pi∗ =
arg maxpi V
pi (which exists in a finite MDP). If the model of
the MDP, consisting of r and P , is given, the value iteration
algorithm can be used to obtain the optimal value function,
V ∗, by computing the fixed-point of the system of Bellman
equations (Bellmann, 1957): V ∗(s) = maxa
(
r(s, a) +
γ
∑
s′ P (s
′|s, a)V ∗(s′)
)
,∀s. The optimal policy pi∗ can
be obtained by acting greedily with respect to V ∗.
Because in general the true model of the environment is
unknown, one approach that can be used to solve the opti-
mization above is to use data in order to construct an approx-
imate model, 〈rˆ, Pˆ 〉, usually by using maximum likelihood
estimation, then solve the corresponding approximate MDP
Mˆ . This approach is called model-based RL or certainty-
equivalence (CE) control. Given a finite amount of data, the
estimate of the model will be inaccurate, and thus we will
be interested in evaluating the optimal policy obtained in
this way, pi∗
Mˆ
, in the true MDP M . We denote by V piM the
value of any policy pi when evaluated in M . Our results will
bound the value loss of various policies computed from an
approximate MDP compared to the true optimal value, in
some `p-norm, ||V piMˆM − V ∗M ||p.
3. Affordances
In an MDP, we usually assume that all actions are available
in all states, and the model 〈r, P 〉 therefore has to be defined
for all (s, a). We now build a framework for defining and
using affordances, which limit the state-action space of
interest. For this, we need to formalize Gibson’s intuition
of “action success”. Because we would like affordances
to generalize across environments with different rewards,
we start by considering a notion of “intent” of an action,
and we consider an action to have succeeded if it realizes
its intent. For example, having a coffee machine affords
the action of making coffee, because we can successfully
obtain coffee from the machine. This does not necessarily
mean the action is desirable in the current context: if the
agent must go to sleep soon, or has an upset stomach, the
reward for drinking coffee might be negative. Nonetheless,
the action itself can be executed and would result in the
intended consequence of possessing coffee. This example
gives the intuition that intent is best captured by thinking
about a target state distribution that should be achieved after
executing an action.
Definition 1 (Intent Ia): Given an MDP M and action
a ∈ A, an intent is a map from states to desired state
distributions that should be obtained after executing a, Ia :
S → Dist(S). An intent Ia is satisfied to a degree, , at
state s ∈ S if and only if:
d(Ia(s), P (·|s, a)) ≤ , (1)
where d is a metric between probability distributions and
 ∈ [0, 1] is a desired precision. An intent Ia is satisfied to
a degree  in MDP M if and only if it is satisfied to degree 
∀s ∈ S.
In this work, we will take d to be the total variation metric:
d(P,Q) = 12
∑
x∈X |P (x) − Q(x)| where X is assumed
to be discrete and finite. Note that d = 0 iff P and Q are
identical, and the maximum value possible for d is 1 (which
will make it convenient to use ).
This notion of intent is similar to empowerment (Salge et al.,
2014) or to setting a goal for the agent to reach after a
temporally extended action (Schaul et al., 2015; Nachum
et al., 2018). Note that if the intent maps all states to the
same distribution, we capture a strong notion of invariance
(a kind of “funneling”), so that the result of the action is
insensitive to the state in which it is executed.
Based on this definition, it is clear that any intent can be
satisfied if we set  = 1. Depending on , there may be
no way to satisfy an intent for an action, given that the
conditioning is over all states in the MDP. However, for
the intents that were satisfied, we could imagine the agent
planning in an approximate MDP in which Ia replaces the
transition model, because action a will reliably take states
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(a) Move Intent (b) Move Left Intent
Figure 1. Visualization of affordances in a grid-world. Affor-
dances are the subset of states and actions which satisfy the intents
to a desired degree (Cf. Def 1). Affordances are shown for intents
specified as bringing (a) any change in position ∆y or ∆x, and
(b) a change of −∆x only. Grid cells and arrows in each cell
represent the states and actions respectively. See appendix for
more illustrations.
into a known distribution, when a completes. If Ia happened
to have support only at one state, i.e. a is deterministic, then
the planning could also be really efficient.
For example, in a navigation task like the one depicted in
Fig. 1, an agent that intends to move left can do so in many
states, but not in the ones that are immediately adjacent to
the left wall. We build the notion of affordances with the
goal of restricting the state-action pairs so as to allow intents
to be satisfied.
Definition 2 (Affordances AFI): Given a finite MDP, a
set of intents I = ∪a∈AIa, and  ∈ [0, 1], we define the
affordance AFI associated with I as a relation AFI ⊆
S ×A, such that ∀(s, a) ∈ AFI , Ia is satisfied to degree 
in s.
We will use AFI(s) ⊂ A to denote the set of actions a
such that (s, a) ∈ AFI .
Illustration To illustrate the idea of intents and affordances,
consider the navigation task depicted in Fig. 1, in which
the agent always has 4 available actions that move it de-
terministically to a neighbouring state, unless the agent is
next to a wall, in which case it remains in the same position.
Consider the intent to be a change in the agent’s current
position. Given this intent specification, the affordance cor-
responding to any  < 1 contains the subset of state-action
pairs marked in Fig 1(a), i.e. the grid cells and actions which
successfully change the agent’s position. It excludes state-
action pairs which move the agent into a wall. Note that
if the probability of “success” of an action were psucc, any
 < psucc would result in the same affordance. Similarly,
the affordance corresponding to the intent of moving left
is depicted in Fig 1(b). Note that it is possible to obtain an
empty affordance for values of  that are too stringent. We
will further examine the effect of  in our experiments.
Our definitions assume that an agent starts from an intent
specification, which could either be given a priori, specified
by a human in the loop, given by a planner, or learned and
adapted over time. Affordances are then constructed on
the basis of the intents. Our definitions are intended to
allow RL agents to capture dynamics that are consistent
and invariant to various factors in the environment. For
example, in navigation tasks, we would like the agent to
handle intents and affordances that allow its models to be
robust with respect to variations such as the location of the
walls, or the exact shape and size of the rooms. Examples
of such invariances are given in Fig. A7.
4. Value Loss Analysis
Given an MDP M and set of intents I, it is easy to notice
that we can define an induced MDP MI = 〈S,A, r, PI , γ〉,
where r is the same as in the original MDP, and the set of
intents induces the transition model PI . Since the intent
specifies a desired distribution over next states, we can as-
sume that from the states that afford a specific action a,
the intent is a close-enough approximation of the transition
model to be used ins stead. In all other states, action a does
not need to be considered, so we do not need to model it.
We now study the value loss incurred due to using a model
MI based on intents as a proxy for the true model M .
Theorem 1. Let I be a set of intents and s,a be the mini-
mum degree to which an intent is satisfied for (s, a).∑
s′
∣∣∣PI(s′|s, a)− P (s′|s, a)∣∣∣ ≤ s,a. (2)
Let  = maxs,a s,a. Then, the value loss between the
optimal policy for the original MDP M and the optimal
policy pi∗I computed from the induced MDP MI is given by:
||V pi∗IM − V ∗M ||∞ ≤ 2
γRmax
(1− γ)2 , (3)
where Rmax is the maximum possible value of the reward.
The proof is provided in appendix A.3.1.
5. Planning Loss Bound
So far we considered the effect of using the intent-based
MDP in order to plan. However, we would also like to use
the associated affordance set, AFI , in order to speed up
the planning process. Moreover, we would like to consider
fine-tuning the intent set I by using data.
We consider the certainty-equivalence control setting (as
described in Sec 2), in which we optimize a policy based
on an approximate model MˆAFI . More precisely, we use
data to approximate the model of the MDP, but only for the
set of state-action pairs in the affordanceAFI induced by a
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given set of intents I and a given . State-action pairs which
are not in AFI will be considered impossible.
For simplicity, we assume that  is such that |AFI(s)| ≥
1,∀s ∈ S (in other words, there is at least one action avail-
able in each state).
Note that MˆAFI will have the same reward function r as
the original MDP M , but instead of S ×A, its model will
be defined on AFI . One can think of this MDP as working
with partial models (Talvitie & Singh, 2009), which are
defined only for some state-action pairs.
Let pi∗
MˆAFI
be the optimal policy of MDP MˆAFI . We
quantify the largest absolute difference (over states) between
the value of the true optimal policy with respect to the true
model, pi∗M and that of pi
∗
MˆAFI
when evaluated in M :
Planning Value Loss:
∣∣∣∣∣∣V ∗M − V pi∗MˆAFIM ∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ (4)
Our work builds on the theory developed by Jiang et al.
(2015), which characterizes a bias-variance trade-off in ap-
proximate planning based on the complexity of the policy
class allowed. Jiang et al. (2015) suggest that γ can be
viewed as a parameter that controls the number of policies
that can be optimal, given a fixed state-action space along
with a reward function. The authors draw parallel to super-
vised learning and their theory is suggestive of the fact that
limiting the complexity of the policy class by using γ can
lead to an optimal bias-variance trade-off for a fixed amount
of data.
Note that intuitively, the policy class in our case will depend
on the affordances. For example, if only a single action can
be carried out at any given state, there is only one policy
available. If all actions are always available, the policy class
is the same as in the original MDP M . Hence, the “size” of
the affordance controls the policy class, and of course, this
size depends on  and on the intent set I.
We will now define the policy class for affordances as fol-
lows:
Definition 3 (Policy class ΠI): Given affordance AFI , let
MI be the set of MDPs over the state-action pairs in AFI ,
and let
ΠI = {pi∗M} ∪ {pi : ∃M¯ ∈MI s.t. pi is optimal in M¯}.
Affordances and intents control the size of the policy class
as highlighted in the following remark.
Remark 1. Given a set of intents I, the following state-
ments hold for affordance AFI and their corresponding
policy class ΠI:
1. If ∀s ∈ S, |AFI(s)| = 1 (i.e. only one action is af-
fordable at every state), then |ΠI | = 1.
2. |AFI | ≤ |AFI′ | =⇒ |ΠI | ≤ |ΠI′ |.
We now present our main result. We show that the loss of the
policy for MˆAFI is bounded, with high probability in terms
of the policy class complexity |ΠI |, which is controlled by
the size of the affordance AFI .
Theorem 2. Let MˆAFI be the approximate MDP over af-
fordable state-action pairs. Then certainty equivalent plan-
ning with MˆAFI has planning loss∣∣∣∣∣∣V ∗M − V pi∗MˆAFIM ∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ ≤ 2Rmax(1− γ)2 ←↩
×
(
2γ+
√
1
2n
log
2|AFI ||ΠI |
δ
)
with probability at least 1− δ.
The proof is in appendix A.3.2. Our result has similar im-
plications to Jiang et al. (2015): for a given amount of data,
there will be an optimal affordance size |AFI | that will
provide the best bias-variance trade-off. Note also that as
the amount of data used to estimate the model increases, the
bound shrinks, so the affordance and class of policies can
grow. Intuitively, the planning value loss now becomes a
trade off between the size of affordances |AFI |, the cor-
responding policy space |ΠI | and the approximation error,
. We could be very precise in the choice of intents, but
then the affordance set becomes larger, hence the bound
is looser. Alternatively, we could make the affordance set
much smaller, but that might come at the expense of a poor
approximation in the intent model, thereby loosening the
bound.
6. Empirical Results
In this section, we conduct a set of experiments to illustrate
our theoretical results1. In Sec. 6.1, we study the effect
of planning with partial models constructed using intents
and affordances on the quality of the plans. In Sec 6.2, we
illustrate the potential of affordances to accelerate planning.
Finally, in Sec 6.3 we study the planning accuracy when
we use affordances and data to construct an approximate
MˆAFI (as opposed to using I as an approximate model in
zero-shot fashion).
6.1. Planning with Intents
We first study the impact of planning with given affordances,
as the degree of stochasticity in the environment changes.
Experimental Setup: We consider the gridworld depicted in
Fig. 1, where the actions are modified to be stochastic and
1We provide the source code for all our experimental results at
https://tinyurl.com/y9xkheme.
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Figure 2. The impact of intents and affordances on planning.
The environment is as in Fig. 1. The actions are stochastic and
fail with a probability of 1− p, which is varied in the experiments.
κ = 0.0 will provide maximum coverage of S ×A and therefore
results in performance close to the optimal policy’s performance
for all values of p. As κ increases, the affordance becomes more
selective and the loss increases. The effect is not uniform because
the intents are at the same time more accurate.
fail with probability 1−p. The agent starts in the bottom left
state, and the goal is situated in the top right state. Rewards
are all 0, except at the goal where the reward is 1. We pick
a collection of intents that describe successful movement
in the directions of the different actions, and compute the
affordances for different values of . For the ease of plotting,
in these and the following graphs we will use on the x-axis
κ = 1 − . Hence, for κ = 0, all state-action pairs are
in the affordance. As κ increases, the affordance becomes
smaller. We build the intent-induced MDP MI as described
in Sec. 4, but the transition probabilities are limited only to
state-action pairs in AFI .
Intuitively, as the affordance becomes smaller (by increasing
κ), we will obtain an MDP in which I is more precise, but
which limits the number of actions available at each state.
Hence, it is interesting to inspect the trade-off between
affordance size and value loss. We run value iteration in the
two MDPs, M and MI , to obtain the optimal policies pi∗M
and pi∗MI respectively. We then evaluate and plot ||V ∗M −
V
pi∗I
M ||2.
As the stochasticity in the actions decreases (higher val-
ues of p), a higher value of κ results in more bias, due to
reducing the action space too much. If the actions are de-
terministic (p = 1), the affordance covers all state-action
pairs regardless of the threshold, and the intents always
match the real model, resulting in 0 loss everywhere (Fig. 2,
blue squares). Note that the curves are non-monotonic, be-
cause of the trade-off of using a better intent, which leads to
more precise planning compared to reducing the state-action
space which can introduce systematic errors.
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Figure 3. Planning time for Value Iteration with and without
affordances as a function of grid size. Planning is significantly
quicker with an affordance-aware model as the size of the grid
increases. The shaded areas represent the standard error in the
mean over 10 independent runs.
6.2. Accelerated Planning with Affordances
To quantify the benefits of using a reduced state-action space
through affordances, we investigate the running time of
value iteration when planning in MI , compared to planning
with the true model M .
Experimental Setup: We run value iteration in two MDPs,
Pachinko and One-room (depicted in Fig. A7), and simulate
progressively difficult problems by increasing the size of
the grid from 7 to 25. In both environments, the actions fail
with probability 0.5, lead to a neighbouring state chosen
uniformly at random. In Pachinko, the wall configuration
restricts paths through the maze. We use the same intents as
before, and a threshold κ = 0.5 to build the affordance. We
measure the planning time as the time taken for the value
iteration updates to be below a given, small threshold.
Using the affordances significantly reduces the planning
time, compared to using the full model, especially for the
environments larger than size 15 (Fig. 3). Hence, appropri-
ate affordances can result in planning more efficiently.
6.3. Planning Loss with Affordances and Learned
Models
Thm. 2 shows that the planning value loss depends on the
size of the affordances, |AFI |, and the amount of data
used to estimate the model. We now study empirically
the planning value loss for varying amounts of data and
affordance size.
Experimental Setup: For this experiment we use a 19× 19
Pachinko grid world (Fig. A7). The probability of success
of the actions is drawn uniformly at random from [0.1, 1]
for each state. We estimate the model MˆAFI from the
data which is generated by randomly sampling a state s
and then taking a sequence of 10 uniformly random actions.
For each state-action pair (s, a) which has not been visited,
the distribution over the next state, P (·|s, a), is initialized
uniformly.
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Figure 4. Planning Value Loss Evaluation. A model MˆAFI is
learned from the data, but state-action pairs that are not in the
affordance are excluded. In the small data regime, an intermediate
value of κ is optimal as anticipated. With increase in the amount
of data used to estimate the model, the planning loss eventually
shrinks, as predicted by the theory, and increasing |AFI | becomes
better. The shaded areas show the standard error of the mean over
10 independent runs.
We observe in Fig. 4 that for the small data regime (n = 25−
200 trajectories), the minimum planning loss is achieved at
intermediate values of κ, which lead to an intermediate size
of |AFI |. This result corroborates our theoretical bound.
As expected, increasing the dataset size reduces the planning
loss. Most importantly, we see a bias-variance trade off
with the variation in the size of the affordance, as predicted
by the bound in Sec. 5. Models learned with scarce data
and a selective affordance (high κ) lead to high errors, due
to bias. If the affordance is not sufficiently selective, the
model estimated is inaccurate, due to high variance, and the
planning loss is also higher.
7. Learning Affordances and Partial-Models
with Function Approximation
In the previous section, we investigated the use of
affordance-aware models to improve planning. However,
the affordance was given a priori. In this section, we de-
scribe how we can learn and leverage affordances in large
state and action spaces, by using function approximation. In
Sec. 7.1, we describe how to learn affordances through expe-
rience collected by an agent, in both discrete and continuous
environments. In Sec. 7.2, we then use the learned affor-
dances to estimate partial models, which offer simplicity
and better generalization.
7.1. Learning Affordances
We represent an affordance as a classifier, Aθ(s, a, I), pa-
rameterized by θ, which predicts whether a state s ∈ S
and action a ∈ A can complete an intent, I ∈ I. We as-
sume that we have access to an intent-completion function,
c(s, a, s′, I) : S × A × S × I → [0, 1], that indicates if
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Figure 5. Learned affordances in a continuous world.
Heatmaps show the probability of completing four distinct intents
by the affordance classifier, Aθ for the the action, F = (0.1, 0.1)
at every position in the world. Aθ correctly predicts that the intent
+∆x cannot be completed near the right walls, since going right
has no effect on the agent’s position there. Similarly +∆y cannot
be completed near the upper walls. Finally the two intents, −∆y
and −∆x, which describe movement in the opposite direction of
the action, have close to zero probability.
s′ ∈ Ia(s) for a given intent2. Transitions (s, a, s′), are
collected from the environment and their intent completions
c(s, a, s′, I) ∀I ∈ I are evaluated, to create a dataset, D.
We use the standard cross-entropy objective to train Aθ:
OA(θ) = −
∑
(s,a,s′)∈D
∑
I∈I
c(s, a, s′, I) logAθ(s, a, I)
Experimental Setup: We consider a continuous world where
the agent can be in any position (x, y) within a 2 × 2 2D
box (Fig A8). There is an impassable wall that divides the
environment in two. When the environment resets, the start-
ing position of the agent drifts from one side of the wall to
the other. The action space consists of two displacements
for each direction, F = (Fx, Fy). The new position of
the agent is drawn from N (µ = (x + Fx, y + Fy), σ =
0.1). If the action causes the movement through a wall,
the position remains unchanged. We describe intents as
movement in a particular direction: given state transi-
tion (x, x′), c(x, F, x′,+∆x) = 1,∀F iff x′ − x > δ,
for δ ∈ R, and 0 otherwise. We consider four intents:
I = {+∆x,−∆x,+∆y,−∆y}. Training data is collected
by taking uniformly random actions with maximum dis-
placement magnitude of 0.5. We use a two layer neural
network with 32 hidden units and RELU non-linearities
(Nair & Hinton, 2010) and the Adam optimizer (Kingma &
Ba, 2014) with learning rate 0.1 to learn Aθ.
After 2000 updates, we evaluate the probability of complet-
2In this work we consider intents that can be completed in
one step (for example, changing state), so will always be 0 or 1.
However, there are no restrictions on using multi-step intents, by
using discounting, or using learned intents.
What can I do here? A Theory of Affordances in Reinforcement Learning
Left action Right action True Gaussian ModelFor Left action Agent position
Estimated Gaussian Model
for Left action
Estimated Gaussian Model
for Right action
Fx +Fx Fx +Fx
(a) In-distribution Fx = 0.2, Baseline Model
Fx +Fx Fx +Fx
(b) Out-of-distribution Fx = 0.75, Baseline Models
Fx +Fx Fx +Fx
(c) In-distribution Fx = 0.2, Affordance-aware Model
Fx +Fx Fx +Fx
(d) Out-of-distribution Fx = 0.75, Affordance-aware Model
Figure 6. Evaluation of trained baseline and affordance-aware models for two independent seeds. Top row (a,b) features the
Baseline model while the bottom row (c, d) features the Affordance-aware Model. (a) On in-distribution actions, the baseline transition
model learns reasonable predictions. For +Fx, the agent spreads its mass around its position, which might lead to predictions orthogonal
or in the backward direction. (b) For out-of-distribution actions, the baseline transition model shows two failure modes for +Fx: It either
predicts that the agent can go through the wall, or tries to distribute the mass of the next state along the wall. For the left action, −Fx, the
model predicts a degenerate distribution showing orthogonal movement to the action. (c, d) Transition models trained with affordances
predict a reasonable transition distribution for both in-distribution and out of distribution actions. For +Fx, the affordance classifier, Aθ
predicts that no intent can be completed, and therefore the transition model is never queried. The radii of the circles show 2 standard
deviations of the predicted model. See Fig A10, A11, A12, and A13 for more comparisons.
ing the four intents for action F = (0.1, 0.1) The classifier
correctly learns that it cannot complete any intent near the
walls (Fig 5), and that applying a positive Fx and Fy cannot
complete the intents −∆x and −∆y.
Analogous to the learning process in continuous environ-
ments, we are able to learn affordances in the discrete grid-
world (Fig A7). The algorithm we use to learn affordances
has no requirements on the state- action space and therefore
is expected to scale to more complex environments provided
we have access to intents.
7.2. Affordance-aware Partial-Model Learning
In this section with demonstrate the practical use of having
an affordance classifier in combination with a generative
model of the environment. In particular, during training
we use the affordance classifier to mask out transition data
which do not complete any intent allowing the model to
focus on learning from transitions that are relevant. During
inference, we first query the affordance classifier to output
if a state-action pair achieves any intent before querying the
model for predictions. We show that the affordance-aware
partial model produces better qualitative predictions and
generalizes to out-of-distribution transition data.
Experimental Setup: We re-use the continuous world from
Sec 7.1. Since the underlying world uses a Gaussian model
for transition noise, we use a Gaussian generative model,
Pφ(s
′|a, s) = N (µφ(s, a), σφ(s, a)), to estimate the transi-
tion dynamics. Here µφ and σφ are function approximators
with parameters φ, that estimate the mean and standard
deviation of the distribution. To obtain a baseline model,
we maximize the log probability of the next state transi-
tion: Obaseline(φ) =
∑
(s,a,s′)∈D logPφ(s
′|s, a). To train
an affordance-aware model, we use the outputs of the affor-
dance classifier, Aθ, to mask the loss for Pφ:
Oaff(φ) =
∑
(s,a,s′)∈D
1
[
max
∀I∈I
Aθ(s, a, I) > k
]
logPφ(s
′|s, a)
for a threshold k = 0.5 and 1 is the indicator function that
returns 1 if the argument is True3. This loss focuses the
learning of the model on transitions that complete an intent.
In this setting, both the affordance classifier and the partial
model are trained simultaneously.
After training for 7000 updates, both the baseline and
affordance-aware models achieve a similar training loss
(Fig. A10). To understand how these models behave, we
inspect their predictions near the wall, by querying two ac-
tions: −Fx, which leads to leftwards movement and +Fx.
which will not have any effect due to the impassable wall.
We keep Fy = 0 fixed.
In-distribution qualitative behavior: We first consider the
actions that are seen during training. For Fx = −0.2, two
out of five baseline models predict an incorrect or offset tran-
sition distribution (See two representative seeds in Fig. 6(a)
and all Fig. A10) compared to near-perfect predictions in
all runs of the affordance-aware model (See two representa-
tive seeds in Fig. 6(c) and all in Fig. A11). For the action
Fx = +0.2, which moves into the wall, the baseline model
distributes the mass of its predictions along the wall. This
is reasonable considering, that the agent will not move and
the model is restricted to produce a Gaussian prediction. On
the other hand, the affordance-aware model first uses Aθ
to determine that the action can not complete an intent in
3The full algorithm is detailed in Alg. 2 and source code is
provided.
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this situation and Pφ is never queried. In a planning setting
(Schrittwieser et al., 2019), such a model could be used to
reduce the number of actions considered and thereby reduce
computational complexity.
Out-of-distribution qualitative behavior: To analyze how
these learned models generalize, we evaluate them using
a displacement never seen during training. For the action,
Fx = −0.75, only 1 out of 5 baseline models predicts a
good solution. Most distributions are offset or have a wide
standard deviation (See two representative seeds in Fig. 6(b)
and all in Fig. A12). In contrast, all affordance-aware mod-
els predict reasonable distributions (See two representative
seeds in Fig. 6(d) and all in Fig. A13). For Fx = +0.75,
which cannot be executed in the environment, the baseline
model predicts that the agent can move through the wall
(Fig. 6(b)) while the affordance-mask determines that the
partial model cannot be queried for this action (Fig. 6(d)).
These results indicate that despite having similar quantita-
tive losses, the baseline and affordance-aware models have
qualitatively different behavior. In retrospect, this is not sur-
prising given that they have vastly different learning goals.
The baseline models need to take into account the edge cases
to make good predictions in all situations. On the other hand,
since the classifier prevents us from querying the affordance-
aware model when the action cannot be executed, it need
only learn the rule: N (µ = Fx + x, σ = 0.1).
This section used the affordance classifier to focus the train-
ing of transition models on actions that are relevant. Our
results show that the affordance-aware model can generalize
to out-of-distribution actions. We expect that in environ-
ments with pixel-based (Kaiser et al., 2020) or other struc-
tured observations the model will likely also generalize to
novel states.
8. Related Work
Affordances have a rich history in a variety of fields such as
robotics, psychology, ecology, and computer vision. This
notion originated in psychology Gibson (1977); Heft (1989);
Chemero (2003), but our approach is more related to the
use of goals and preconditions for actions in classical AI
systems, such as STRIPS (Fikes & Nilsson, 1971).
In AI, researchers have also studied object-affordances, in
order to map actions to objects (Slocum et al., 2000; Fitz-
patrick et al., 2003; Lopes et al., 2007). Montesano et al.
(2008) presented a developmental approach to learning ob-
ject affordances. Their approach focuses on robots that learn
basic skills such as visual segmentation, color, and shape
detection. Different modalities have been used to detect
affordances, such as visuo-motor simulation (Schenck et al.,
2012), visual characteristics (Song et al., 2015), and text
embeddings (Fulda et al., 2017).
In the context of MDPs, Abel et al. (2014) define affor-
dances as propositional functions on states. In particular, af-
fordances consist of a mapping 〈p, g〉 → A′ where A′ ⊂ A
represents the relevant action-possibilities, p is a predicate
on states S → {0, 1} representing the precondition for the
affordance and g is an ungrounded predicate on states rep-
resenting a lifted goal description. An extension learns
affordances in the context of goal-based priors (Abel et al.,
2015): they learn probability distributions over the opti-
mality of each action for a given state and goal. However,
their approach relies on Object Oriented-MDPs (Diuk et al.,
2008), which assume the existence of objects and object
class descriptions. Our approach is more general, using
MDPs of any kind, and does not assume any knowledge
about existing object classes or their attributes. Addition-
ally, their work assumes that the model of the OO-MDP is
given to the agent upfront.
Cruz et al. (2014) demonstrate the utility of affordances
given as prior knowledge to RL agents. Later, Cruz et al.
(2016; 2018) learned contextual affordances as a tuple of
〈state, object, action, effect〉. Their approach, however, de-
pends on known objects, such as “sponge” or “cup”, in the
construction of a state, which poses considerable restric-
tions. Instead, we pursue learning general purpose affor-
dances from data and do not make any such object-centric
assumptions.
A related family of approaches involves learning when to
prune actions (Even-Dar et al., 2003; Sherstov & Stone,
2005; Rosman & Ramamoorthy, 2012; Zahavy et al., 2018)
in order to cope with large action-spaces. Recently, Al-
phaStar used a similar approach of action masks to prune
the action-space derived from human data (Vinyals et al.,
2019). Our goal is to not only learn what can be done in a
given state, but also build simpler, more robust models from
this understanding. Besides, our approach to affordances
can be used also to characterize states, not just to eliminate
actions.
Much of the work on partial models (Oh et al., 2017; Amos
et al., 2018; Guo et al., 2018; Gregor et al., 2019) focuses
on models that predict only some of the state variables,
or that make latent-space predictions (Schrittwieser et al.,
2019), rather than restricting the space of actions considered
in a given state. Our work is complimentary to existing
techniques for building partial models in that they could
still leverage our approach to reduce the number of actions,
thereby further reducing the computational complexity of
planning.
9. Discussion and Future work
We have laid the foundation of using affordances in RL to
achieve two goals: 1) decreasing the computational com-
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plexity of planning, and 2) enabling the stable learning of
partial models from data, which can generalize better than
full models.
One limitation of our work is that affordances are con-
structed based on intents, which are specified a priori. How-
ever, intents could also be learned from data—a problem
which ties closely to subgoal discovery in temporal abstrac-
tion (McGovern & Barto, 2001; S¸ims¸ek et al., 2005). Criti-
cal states (Goyal et al., 2019; Nair & Finn, 2019) that are
important for decision making would be ideal candidates to
include in intent distributions.
A promising future theoretical direction would be to estab-
lish a bound on the number of samples required to learn
affordance-aware partial models. Intuitively, and as shown
in our results, it should be much faster to learn a simpler
model on a subset of states and actions, compared to a com-
plex model class for the full state and action space. Our
results from Sec. 7 suggest that learned affordances can be
used to estimate approximate transition models that are sim-
pler and generalize better, despite reaching similar training
losses.
Finally, while we focused on affordances for primitive ac-
tions, we believe that an important application of this idea
will be in the context of hierarchical reinforcement learning
(Asadi & Huber, 2007; Manoury et al., 2019), where intents
are akin to subgoals and affordances could then take the
role of initiation sets for options (Khetarpal et al., 2020).
Intents could then be learned using information theoretic
criteria proposed for option terminations as in Harutyunyan
et al. (2019). Future avenues for this work in the context
of option models (Sutton et al., 1999) could potentially in-
clude modelling long-term side effects of actions that do not
match any of the intents. Moreover, if agents are allowed
to create new, extended actions, using affordances would
provide an effective way to control planning complexity,
given ever-expanding action sets.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Reproducibility
We follow the reproducibility checklist by (Pineau, 2019) to ensure this research is reproducible. For all algorithms presented,
we include a clear description of the algorithm and source code is included with these supplementary materials. For any
theoretical claims, we include: a statement of the result, a clear explanation of any assumptions, and complete proofs of any
claims. For all figures that present empirical results, we include: the empirical details of how the experiments were run, a
clear definition of the specific measure or statistics used to report results, and a description of results with the standard error
in all cases. All figures with the returns show the standard error across multiple independent random seeds. In the following
section, we provide complete details of the computing requirements and dependencies for the code.
A.2. Computing and Open source libraries.
All experiments were conducted using free Google Colab instances4. We used EasyMDP version 0.0.5 for the GridWorlds
in Section 6. For the function approximators and probabilistic models in Section 7 we used Tensorflow version 2.15 and
Tensorflow Probability version 0.9.06 respectively. Source code is provided at https://tinyurl.com/y9xkheme.
A.3. Proofs
A.3.1. PROOF OF VALUE LOSS BOUND
Theorem 1. Let I be a set of intents and s,a be the minimum degree to which an intent is satisfied for (s, a).∑
s′
∣∣∣PI(s′|s, a)− P (s′|s, a)∣∣∣ ≤ s,a.
Let  = maxs,a s,a. Then, the value loss between the optimal policy for the original MDP M and the optimal policy pi∗I
computed from the induced MDP MI is given by:
||V pi∗IM − V ∗M ||∞ ≤ 2
γRmax
(1− γ)2 ,
where Rmax is the maximum possible value of the reward.
Proof. The value loss that we want to bound is given by:
||V pi∗IM − V ∗M ||∞ = max
s∈S
∣∣∣V pi∗IM (s)− V ∗M (s)∣∣∣ ≤ max
s∈S
∣∣∣V ∗M (s)− V ∗MI (s)∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 1
+ max
s∈S
∣∣∣V pi∗IM (s)− V ∗MI (s)∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 2
(5)
where we used the triangle inequality in the last step.
In order to bound Term 1, we first define the distance function dFM1,M2 between two MDPs M1 and M2 that differ only in
their dynamics as follows.
Definition 4 (dFM1,M2): Given two MDPs M1 and M2 with dynamics P1 and P2 respectively, and function f : S → R,
define:
dfM1,M2(s, a) :=
∣∣∣Es′∼P1(.|s,a)[f(s′)]− Es′∼P2(.|s,a)[f(s′)]∣∣∣.
For any set of functions F, define:
dFM1,M2(s, a) := sup
f∈F
dfM1,M2(s, a). (6)
We now introduce Lemma 1 from (Jiang, 2018), which we will use to establish our result.
4https://colab.research.google.com/
5tensorflow.org
6https://github.com/tensorflow/probability/releases/tag/v0.9.0
What can I do here? A Theory of Affordances in Reinforcement Learning
Lemma 1. (Jiang, 2018) Given any M1 and M2, and any set F of value functions containing V ∗M1 (i.e. V
∗
M1
∈ F ), we have:
||V ∗M1 − V ∗M2 ||∞ ≤ H||dFM1,M2 ||∞, (7)
where H is the horizon used in computing the value functions V ∗M1 and V
∗
M2
.
We invoke Lemma 1 in the case of discounted infinite horizon MDPs. Therefore:
||V ∗M − V ∗MI ||∞ ≤
1
(1− γ) ||d
F
M,MI ||∞ (8)
Consider now that M1 and M2 have the same reward function, and let f : S → R be a function bounded by Rmax. Using
the Bellman equation, the term dfM,MI can be expanded as follows:
dfM,MI (s, a) =
∣∣∣∑
s′
P (s′|s, a)γf(s′)−
∑
s′
PI(s′|s, a)γf(s′)
∣∣∣
≤
∑
s′
γ|f(s′)| |P (s′|s, a)− PI(s′|s, a)| ≤ s,a γRmax
(1− γ)
where in the last step we used the notation introduced in Eq. (2).
Now, to be able to plug this bound back in Equation 8, we need to consider the infinity norm:
||dFM,MI ||∞ = maxs,a s,a
γRmax
(1− γ) (9)
Plugging the above back in Equation 8 and using Equation 2 yields:
||V ∗M − V ∗MI ||∞ ≤ 
γRmax
(1− γ)2 . (10)
We now consider the Term 2. Note that we now have to analyze the value loss between the optimal policy for the original
MDP M and the optimal policy pi∗I for the induced MDP MI . In other words, we would like to bound the policy evaluation
error in the intended MDP as follows:
max
s∈S
∣∣∣V pi∗IM (s)− V ∗MI (s)∣∣∣ = maxs∈S ∣∣∣V pi∗IM (s)− V pi∗IMI (s)∣∣∣ (11)
Expanding each term as follows:
V
pi∗I
M (s)− V pi
∗
I
MI (s) =
(
R(s, pi∗I(s)) + γEs′∼P (.|s,a)[V
pi∗I
M (s
′)]
)
−
(
R(s, pi∗I(s)) + γEs′∼PI(.|s,a)[V
pi∗I
MI (s
′)]
)
(12)
Considering that the rewards are known and same, we have:
V
pi∗I
M (s)− V pi
∗
I
MI (s) = γEs′∼P (.|s,a)[V
pi∗I
M (s
′)]− γEs′∼PI(.|s,a)[V pi
∗
I
MI (s
′)] (13)
Considering the max over all states as we are interested in Term 1, and following through the proof of Lemma 1, we have:
max
s∈S
∣∣∣V pi∗IM (s)− V ∗MI (s)∣∣∣ ≤ ||dFM,MI ||∞ + maxS,A ∣∣∣Es′∼PI(.|s,a)[V pi∗IM (s′)]− Es′∼PI(.|s,a)[V pi∗IMI (s′)]∣∣∣ (14)
Using the notation introduced in Eq. (2) and expanding the inequality H = 1/(1− γ) times, it follows:
max
s∈S
∣∣∣V pi∗IM (s)− V ∗MI (s)∣∣∣ ≤  γRmax(1− γ)2 (15)
Combining Term 1 and 2 bounds yields the final result in Equation 3.
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A.3.2. PROOF OF PLANNING LOSS BOUND
Definition 5 (Policy class ΠI): Given affordance AFI , letMI be the set of MDPs over the state-action pairs in AFI ,
and let
ΠI = {pi∗M} ∪ {pi : ∃M¯ ∈MI s.t. pi is optimal in M¯}.
Theorem 2. Let MˆAFI be the approximate MDP over affordable state-action pairs. Then the certainty equivalence
planning with MˆAFI has planning loss∣∣∣∣∣∣V ∗M − V pi∗MˆAFIM ∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ ≤ 2Rmax(1− γ)2
(
2γ+
√
1
2n
log
2|AFI ||ΠI |
δ
)
with probability at least 1− δ.
Proof. Let us consider that the world is represented by an MDP M : 〈S,A, R, γ, P 〉. Let PI to denote proxy models based
on the collection of intents I, and the resulting intended MDP is denoted by MI : 〈S,A, r, PI , γ〉. We are now interested
in estimating MI via the data samples experienced by the agent. Let’s consider this estimated model to be MˆAFI , where
MˆAFI : 〈S,A, R, γ, PˆI〉. In particular, we are interested in the CE-control policy, which is discussed in more detail in the
main paper. Let pi∗
MˆAFI
be the optimal policy of MDP MˆAFI . We quantify the largest absolute difference (over states)
between the value of the true optimal policy with respect to the true model, pi∗M and that of pi
∗
MˆAFI
when evaluated in M :
Planning Value Loss:
∣∣∣∣∣∣V ∗M − V pi∗MˆAFIM ∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ (16)
It is to be noted that our proof builds on the theory proposed by Jiang et al. (2015). However, we are not concerned with the
dependence of planning value loss on the effective horizon, and consider a fixed discount factor γ. We follow through the
steps of the proof of Theorem 2 of Jiang et al. (2015) and prove this theorem using the lemmas below: Lemma 2, Lemma 3,
and Lemma 4, and 5.
Lemma 2. (Jiang et al., 2015) For any MDP MˆAFI with Rˆ = R, which is an approximate model of the MDP given by the
intent collection I, we have ∣∣∣∣∣∣V ∗MI − V pi∗MˆAFIMI ∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ ≤ 2 maxpi∈ΠI ||V piMI − V piMˆAFI ||∞ (17)
Proof. ∀s ∈ S Let us consider:
V ∗MI (s)− V
pi∗
MˆAFI
MI (s)
=
(
V ∗MI (s)− V
pi∗MI
MˆAFI
(s)
)
+
(
V
pi∗MI
MˆAFI
(s)− V ∗
MˆAFI
(s)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+
(
V ∗
MˆAFI
(s)− V
pi∗
MˆAFI
MI (s)
)
≤
(
V ∗MI (s)− V
pi∗MI
MˆAFI
(s)
)
−
(
V ∗
MˆAFI
(s)− V
pi∗
MˆAFI
MI (s)
)
≤ 2 max
pi∈
{
pi∗
MˆAFI
,pi∗MI
} ∣∣∣V piMI (s)− V piMˆAFI (s)∣∣∣
Taking a max over all states on both sides of the inequality and noticing that the set of all policies is a trivial super set of{
pi∗
MˆAFI
, pi∗MI
}
∈ ΠI , from which the final result follows.
We now turn to Lemma 3.
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Lemma 3. (Jiang et al., 2015) For any MDP MˆAFI with Rˆ = R bounded by [0, Rmax] which is an approximate of the
MDP estimated from data experienced in the world for a set of intents I,
∣∣∣∣∣∣V piMI − V piMˆAFI ∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ ≤ 1(1− γ)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
a∈AFI(s)
(
R(s, a) + γ〈PˆI(s, a, ; ), V piMI 〉
)
− V piMI
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
. (18)
Proof. Given any policy pi, define state-value function V0, V1, . . . Vm such that V0 = V piMI ,
From this point onward, we use AFI(a) and AFI(s) to denote affordable states and affordable actions respectively.
∀s ∈ AFI(a)
Vm(s) =
∑
a∈AFI(s)
pi(a|s)
(
R(s, a) + γ〈PˆI(s, a, ; ), Vm−1〉
)
Therefore:
||Vm − Vm−1||∞ = max
s
 ∑
a∈AFI(s)
pi(a|s)γ
〈
PˆI(s, a, ; ), (Vm−1 − Vm−2)
〉
≤ γmax
s
∑
a∈AFI(s)
pi(a|s)PˆI(s, a, ; )||Vm−1 − Vm−2||∞
(19)
Since 〈PˆI(s, a, ; ), f〉 =
∑
s′ PˆI(s, a, s
′) · f(s′)∑
s′
PˆI(s, a, s′) · f(s′) ≤
∑
s′
PˆI(s, a, s′) · |f |∞
= |f |∞ since ||PˆI ||1 = 1
Therefore
||Vm − Vm−1||∞ ≤ γ||Vm−1 − Vm−2||∞
Therefore, ||Vm − V0||∞
∑m−1
k=0 ||Vk+1 − Vk||∞ ≤ ||V1 − V0||∞
∑m−1
k=1 γ
k−1
Taking the limit m→∞, Vm → V piMˆAFI , and we have:
||VMˆAFI − V0||∞ ≤
1
1− γ ||V1 − V0||∞
where notice that V0 = V piMI and V1 =
∑
a∈AFI(s) pi(a|s)
(
R+ γ〈PˆI(s, a; ), V piM 〉
)
Therefore,
||V piMI − V piMˆAFI ||∞ ≤
1
(1− γ) ||
∑
a∈AFI(s)
(R(s, a) + γ〈PˆI(s, a, ; ), V piMI 〉)− V piMI ||∞
Lemma 4. The following holds with probability at least 1− δ:
∣∣∣∣∣∣V ∗MI − V pi∗MˆAFIMI ∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ ≤ 2Rmax(1− γ)2
√
1
2n
log
2|AFI ||ΠI |
δ
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Proof. Using Lemma 2 and 3, we have∥∥∥∥V pi∗MIMI − V pi∗MˆAFIMI ∥∥∥∥∞ ≤ 2 maxpi∈ΠI ||V piMI − V piMˆAFI ||∞
≤ max
pi∈ΠI
2
(1− γ)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
a∈AFI(s)
(R(s, a) + γ〈PˆI(s, a, ; ), V piMI 〉)− V piMI
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ max
s∈S,pi∈ΠI
2
(1− γ)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
a∈AFI(s)
(R(s, a) + γ〈PˆI(s, a, ; ), V piMI 〉)− V piMI
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
Since
∑
a∈AFI(s)(R(s, a) + γ〈PˆI(s, a, ; ), V piMI 〉) is the average of the IID samples the agent obtains by interacting with
the environment, bounded in [0,Rmax] with mean V piMI (for any s, a, pi tuple). Then according to Hoeffdings inequality,
∀t ≥ 0, P
(∣∣∣ ∑
a∈AFI(s)
R(s, a) + γ〈PˆI(s, a, ; ), V piMI 〉 − V piMI
∣∣∣ > t) ≤ 2 exp{ −2nt2
(Rmax)2/(1− γ)2
}
To obtain a uniform bound over all s, a, pi tuples, we equate the RHS to δ|AFI(a)||AFI(s)|ΠI | and the result follows as shown
below.
2 exp
{ −2nt2
(Rmax)2/(1− γ)2
}
=
δ
|AFI(a)||AFI(s)||ΠI |
−2nt2
(Rmax)2/(1− γ)2 = log
δ
2|AFI(a)||AFI(s)||ΠI |
2nt2
(Rmax)2/(1− γ)2 = log
2|AFI(a)||AFI(s)||ΠI |
δ
t2 =
(Rmax)2
(1− γ)2
1
2n
log
2|AFI(a)||AFI(s)||ΠI |
δ
t =
Rmax
(1− γ)
√
1
2n
log
2|AFI(a)||AFI(s)||ΠI |
δ
We express the state-action pairs in affordances as the size of affordances. Formally, the size of affordances for a intent can
be expressed as |AFI |. Plugging this back, we get the final result:
||V ∗MI − V
pi∗
MˆAFI
MI ||∞ ≤
2Rmax
(1− γ)2
√
1
2n
log
2|AFI ||ΠI |
δ
The following lemma is very similar to a result on the error with respect to the optimal value function, as proved in (Jiang,
2018).
Lemma 5. Given any policy pi, and any set F of value functions containing V piM , we have
||V piM − V piMI ||∞ ≤
γ
1− γ ||d
F
M,MI ||∞. (20)
Proof. In the proof below, for any model M , we will use T piM to denote the Bellman opearator
T piMf =
∑
a
pi(a|s)
(
R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
PM (s
′|s, a)f(s′)
)
.
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The Bellman operator has the following property (for any two models M2 and M2): For the first term,
(T piM1 − T piM2)f(s)
=
∑
a
pi(a|s)
(
R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
PM1(s
′|s, a)f(s′)
)
−
∑
a
pi(a|s)
(
R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
PM2(s
′|s, a)f(s′)
)
=
∑
a
pi(a|s)γ
(∑
s′
PM1(s
′|s, a)f(s′)−
∑
s′
PM2(s
′|s, a)f(s′)
)
≤
∑
a
γpi(a|s)dfM1,M2 = γd
f
M1,M2
where dfM1,M2 is the metric defined in Section A.3.1.
T piMf1(s)− T piMf2(s) =
=
∑
a
pi(a|s)
(
R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
PM (s
′|s, a)f1(s′)
)
−
∑
a
pi(a|s)
(
R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′
PM (s
′|s, a)f2(s′)
)
=
∑
a
pi(a|s)γ
∑
s′
PM (s
′|s, a) (f1(s′)− f2(s′))
≤
∑
a
pi(a|s)γ
∑
s′
PM (s
′|s, a)||f1 − f2||∞ = γ||f1 − f2||∞
Now, the following holds for the initial value error we are interested to bound:
||V piM − V piMI ||∞ ≤ ||V piM − T piMIV piM ||∞ + ||T piMIV piM − V piMI ||∞
= ||T piMV piM − T piMIV piM ||∞ + ||T piMIV piM − T piMIV piMI ||∞
= ||(T piM − T piMI )V piM ||∞ + ||T piMI (V piM − V piMI )||∞
≤ γ||dFM,MI ||∞ + γ||V piM − V piMI ||∞
Unfolding the above to infinity, we obtain in the limit the following:
||V piM − V piMI ||∞ ≤
γ
1− γ ||d
F
M,MI ||∞
Now that we have all the necessary Lemmas proved, we can use them to provide the bound for Theorem 2:∣∣∣∣∣∣V ∗M − V pi∗MˆAFIM ∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ ≤ ∣∣∣∣∣∣V ∗M − V pi∗MIM ∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ + ∣∣∣∣∣∣V pi∗MIM − V ∗MI ∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ + ∣∣∣∣∣∣V ∗MI − V pi
∗
MˆAFI
MI
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∞
+
∣∣∣∣∣∣V pi∗MˆAFIMI − V pi∗MˆAFIM ∣∣∣∣∣∣∞
Theorem 1 applies to the first term, Lemma 5 to the second and forth term, and Lemma 4 for the third term. Finally,
∣∣∣∣∣∣V ∗M − V pi∗MˆAFIM ∣∣∣∣∣∣∞ ≤ 2 γRmax(1− γ)2 + 2 γRmax(1− γ)2 + 2Rmax(1− γ)2
√
1
2n
log
2|AFI ||ΠI |
δ
=
2Rmax
(1− γ)2
(
2γ+
√
1
2n
log
2|AFI ||ΠI |
δ
)
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A.4. Empirical Validation: Additional Details
A.4.1. COMPUTATIONALLY BUILDING AFFORDANCES
Consider AFI ⊆ S × A as the subset of state-action pairs that complete a collection of intents specified a priori. To
control the size of affordances, |AFI |, we introduce a threshold k. A state-action pair is deemed affordable if the intent is
completed i.e. s′ ∈ Ia(s) and the P (s, a, s′) ≥ k. For k = 0.0, affordances include all state-action pairs that achieves the
intent. With increasing threshold values, AFI contains relatively smaller subset of state-action space, resulting in a reduced
affordance size. Our final affordance set considers all intents i.e. ∪I∈IAFI ⊂ S ×A. We present the pseudocode for the
empirical analysis of planning value loss bound in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Pseudo code: Planning Value Loss Analysis
Require: Collection of Intents I, where each intent ∀s ∈ S, Ia(s) ∈ Dist(s)
Input: MDP M : 〈S,A, r, P 〉, number of trajectories n, thresholds k
1. Affordances AFI:
AFI ← Computationally Build Affordances (M, I, k) //As explained in Sec A.4.1.
2. Learn Affordance-aware Model MˆAFI :
Transition tuples (s, a, s′, r)← collect trajectories
PˆI ← Count (s, a, s′, r) to estimate model
3. Planning:
pi∗M ← Value Iteration(P,R)
pi∗
MˆAFI
← Value Iteration(PˆI , R)
4. Certainty-Equivalence Control Evaluation:
V
pi∗M
M ← Policy Evaluation(pi∗M , P,R, γ)
V
pi∗
MˆAFI
M ← Policy Evaluation(pi∗MˆAFI , P,R, γ)
Planning Loss←
∣∣∣∣∣∣V ∗M − V pi∗MˆAFIM ∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
Repeat steps 1-4 for different values of k, n, and average over m independent seeds.
A.5. Learning Affordances: Additional Details
A.5.1. LEARNING AFFORDANCES IN DISCRETE ENVIRONMENTS
Following the learning approach described in the Sec 7.1 of the main paper, we are also able to learn affordances in a
variety of discrete grid-world like environments. We demonstrate the learned affordances for different intent specifications
in Fig A7. Note that for a given intent, affordances learned are invariant to various factors such as size of the grid-world, the
location of the walls, etc. and capture the underlying dynamics consistently across environments.
A.5.2. LEARNING AFFORDANCE-AWARE MODELS UNDER MODEL CLASS RESTRICTIONS
In Sec 7.2 we investigated the qualitative behavior of an affordance-aware model. To better understand the convergence
and generalization behavior, we conduct an illustrative experiment with a restricted model class in the Continuous World
(Fig A8). In particular, we consider a restricted class of transition models that aim to capture displacement only, relative to
the current position, and do not have access to state information: Pφ(s′|a, s) = N (s+ µφ(a), σφ(a)). Where µφ and σφ
are learned outputs of a neural networks. Learning this model might be difficult in general due to the walls: The model has
no information about the current state s and therefore, will not be able to predict that near the walls µφ(a) should equal 0. In
contrast, an affordance classifier implicitly encodes the wall information in Aθ and the masking should allow the model to
learn the rule that µφ(a) ≈ a and σφ(a) ≈ 0.1. Here we use a linear approximator for µφ and σφ.
After training for 5000 updates, the affordance-aware model reaches a lower loss than the baseline model (Fig A14). To
quantitatively understand the generalization of the models, we evaluate the mean prediction for a range of actions, Fx, over
5 independent seeds. The baseline model learns that σ ≈ 0.148 while the affordance-aware model estimates σ ≈ 0.133.
Both baseline and affordance-aware models systematically under-estimate the mean (Fig.A15). However, the baseline model
is more cautious, and predicts means that are even smaller than the affordance-aware model, since it needs to account for
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(a) One-room, Move Intent (b) One-room, Move Left
Intent
(c) One-room, Move Intent (d) One-room, Move Left
Intent
(e) Pachinko, Move Left In-
tent
(f) Pachinko, Move Intent (g) Pachinko, Move Up In-
tent
(h) Pachinko, Move Intent
Figure A7. Visualization of learned affordances in a variety of grid-worlds. Affordances and intents are a general concept that can
generalize across environments.
not being able to move near the walls. The predicted mean from the affordance-aware model during the last 200 updates
is significantly closer to the true value, with an average error of 0.038 compared to the baseline model’s error of 0.065
(Student’s T-test, p ≈ 10−28).
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x
0
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Figure A8. Non-stationary Continuous World. The continuous world has agent state represented by (x,y) coordinates. An impassable
wall divides the world into two halves. The action space consists of displacements in the (x,y) directions. The two red crosses indicate the
possible starting positions in the world. The agent will start around one cross for a fixed number of episodes before drifting toward the
other. Upon reaching the next cross, the system reverses the starting state of the agent drifts towards the other.
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Figure A9. Learning curves for training a transition model with and without affordances. Though the losses are similar, qualitative
performance of the models is quite different. Shaded areas show standard error of the mean over 5 independent runs.
Action 1 and 2 Agent position True Gaussian ModelFor Action 1
Estimated Gaussian Model
for Action 1 and 2
Fx +Fx Fx +Fx Fx +Fx
Fx +Fx Fx +Fx
Figure A10. Empirical visualization of a baseline model for five independent seeds.
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Action 1 and 2 Agent position True Gaussian ModelFor Action 1
Estimated Gaussian Model
for Action 1 and 2
Fx +Fx Fx +Fx Fx +Fx
Fx +Fx Fx +Fx
Figure A11. Empirical visualization of an affordance-aware partial model for five independent seeds.
Action 1 and 2 Agent position True Gaussian ModelFor Action 1
Estimated Gaussian Model
for Action 1 and 2
Fx +Fx Fx +Fx Fx +Fx
Fx +Fx Fx +Fx
Figure A12. Empirical visualization of generalization for a baseline model for four independent seeds.
Action 1 and 2 Agent position True Gaussian ModelFor Action 1
Estimated Gaussian Model
for Action 1 and 2
Fx +Fx Fx +Fx Fx +Fx
Fx +Fx Fx +Fx
Figure A13. Empirical visualization of generalization for an affordance-aware partial model for four independent seeds.
Algorithm 2 Pseudo code: Affordance-aware model learning
Require: Collection of intents I.
Require: Environment, E.
Require: Intent completion function c.
Require: Affordance-classifier Aθ.
Require: Generative Model Pφ.
Require: Data collection policy, pi.
Input: Number of transitions n, thresholds δ, k, number of training steps N .
for i = 0 . . . N do
1.Calculate affordance-classifier loss:
{(s, a, s′)}n ← collect trajectories(pi, E, n)
{c}n ← get intent completions({(s, a, s′, i)}n)
D ← {(s, a, s′)}n ∪ {c}n
2. Calculate affordance-classifier loss:
OA(θ)←
∑
(s,a,s′)∈D
∑
I∈I −c(s, a, s′, I) logAθ(s, a, I)
3. Calculate gradient and apply update to θ.
θ ← θ +∇θOA(θ)
4. Calculate model loss:
Oaff(φ)←
∑
(s,a,s′)∈D 1
[
max∀I∈I Aθ(s, a, I) > k
]
logPφ(s
′|s, a)
5. Calculate gradient and apply update to φ.
φ← φ+∇φOaff(φ)
end for
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Figure A14. Learning curves for training a restricted transition model with and without affordances. Shaded areas show standard
error of the mean over 5 independent runs.
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Figure A15. Model prediction accuracy. Independent runs of the models described in Sec. A.5.2. Dotted lines show the true prediction.
The curves show the mean prediction of the models during training. We here show the predictions by both model with affordances
(Aff=True), model without affordances (Aff=False), and ground truth (True µx) with a dotted line.
